ABSTRACT Mobile crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm for collecting sensing data by leveraging contributions of numerous mobile smart phones. It works efficiently with Word of Mouth Mode (WoM), especially for sensing tasks with time and location constraints, since the sensing task can be spread quickly among mobile contributors in the WoM mode. In this paper, we first investigate the behaviors of contributors, categorize all contributors into four types according to their different behaviors, and propose an inviting algorithm for contributors to recruit cooperators through social closeness. Then, we design a reward mechanism for crowdsourcing platform to evaluate the budget and pay the reward to contributors, meanwhile stimulate contributors to make the maximum contribution. Furthermore, considering two different scenarios, we model the interactions among contributors as two Stackelberg games, and backward induction approach is used to analyze each game. We propose an algorithm to compute the best response of every contributor, and we theoretically prove that this proposed algorithm may converge a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. The proposed approach can be applied to task formulation and task budget evaluations for crowdsourcing platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a market model to solve complex tasks via harnessing swarm intelligence, which can be used in Internet of Things (IoT) [1] . In crowdsourcing, with the interest of the involved participants taken into account, IoT devices can be efficiently used for data collection, and the collected data can be shared for maximum benefit. For example, in a city, the widely deployed cameras, vehicles and smart phones carried by pedestrians in the streets can contribute their sensed traffic information to data center, and the data can be processed not only for the observation of the traffic situation in the city, but also for learning and understanding the traffic and social mode of local people. Consequently, in IoT, the distributed data can be efficiently collected with the support of crowdsourcing, and the collected data may be shared efficiently and further used in cognitive computing [2] , [3] .
With the support of widely used mobile intelligent devices which have rich peripherals such as Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, digital cameras, and microphones, and sensors, it is possible to perform crowdsourcing task using mobile terminals, which is called mobile crowdsourcing [4] . As shown in Figure 1 , the mobile crowdsourcing market consists of a crowdsourcing platform and mobile contributors. Once the platform releases crowdsourcing tasks, a large number of mobile contributors will sense crowdsourcing tasks and make a decision to join or not. Nowadays, due to its advantages of high efficiency and convenience, mobile crowdsourcing has been widely considered in environment monitoring, health detection, urban management, public safety, intelligent transportation and other applications [5] , [6] . Given the good prospects of crowdsourcing, both industrial and academic researchers pay more and more attention to it.
In mobile crowdsourcing market, there are two modes for contributors to sense crowdsourcing tasks, namely Direct Mode (DM) and Word of Mouth Mode (WoM) [7] . In DM mode, mobile contributors sense crowdsourcing tasks directly from the platform, and there is no cooperation or information exchange among mobile contributors. Different from DM, WoM means that mobile contributors who have sensed the crowdsourcing task can recruit other mobile contributors to join in the common task based on their social networks, physical encounters, opportunistic network or other means. Although contributors may sense crowdsourcing tasks by different ways, they all work for the platform directly. Notably, as far as the speed of establishing a contributor group is concerned, WoM can do much faster than DM, since the contributors with WoM can communicate directly with each other and flood the task invitations to everybody nearby rapidly. With the development of communication network [8] - [11] , it is efficient to invite other contributors with WoM. It should be pointed out that WoM has good flexibility in satisfying the requirements of different crowdsourcing tasks with different invitation channels. For example, social network can satisfy the demand of the time sensitive crowdsourcing task due to the rapid transitivity of social network, and the opportunistic network can fit the claim of task with geographical location constraints, and diffusing crowdsourcing task invitation by opportunistic meeting can recruit more capable mobile contributors. In the literature, DM mobile crowdsourcing market has been intensively investigated. However, there are relatively few studies devoted to the beneficial changes from DM market to WoM market. Therefore, WoM mobile crowdsourcing is a worthy research topic.
In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, at first, the crowdsourcing platform releases crowdsourcing tasks. Then, contributors sense and join in the tasks. Participated contributors can decide how much data contributed to the platform, and whether to recruit other contributors. At last, contributors upload the collected data to crowdsourcing platform, and they get the corresponding reward from it.
In order to encourage more contributors to join in the task, the crowdsourcing platform offers reward to mobile contributors who invite contributors or accept the invitations from others. In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, every contributor should maintain an invitation list which is used to record the contributors who accept its invitations, and submits the list together with the sensing data to the platform. The platform hence checks the invitation list and calculates reward for contributors in terms of data contribution and contributor invitation. Therefore, the reward of contributors is decided by two points, which are the quantity of uploaded data and the number of invited contributors who successfully join in the task. For the highest reward, each contributor should choose the best strategy. Obviously, contributors will compete with each other for high reward, which is a game problem. In this paper, we formulate the behavior of contributors with Stackelberg game, and explore the interaction behavior among contributors. The main works are summarized as follows.
( The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe and analyze the related work. In Section III, the mobile contributors model is presented for mobile crowdsourcing with WoM. In Section IV, we analyze the interactions among mobile contributors based on game theory. Simulation results are presented in Section V. The last section concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile crowdsourcing relevant technologies have been intensively investigated. Most existing works so far have focused on the problem of mobile crowdsourcing market constructions, the task allocations, incentive mechanism designs, security and privacy protection, evolution mechanism, and so on. In this paper, we study the task allocation and market evolution of single crowdsourcing platform with WoM. Generally speaking, some specific requirements should be considered in crowdsourcing task allocation, for example, budget constraints of the platform, quality requirements of sensing data, location and timeliness limits of crowdsourcing tasks or the diversity and time budget constraints of contributors.
Aiming at the problem of limit budget of platform, TranThanh et al. [12] pointed out an agent budget allocation algorithm called CrowdBudget, which reduced budget estimation error and its performance upgraded 40% more than other algorithms. However, CrowdBudget is not suitable for non-binary task classification, since the agent cannot identify contributors who are capable of distributing tasks. In order to improve the quality of the sensing data, Wang et al. [13] proposed hybrid greed and swarm optimization algorithms to minimize market costs and maximize market returns in view of quality request of crowdsourcing tasks. For ensuring stable spatial coverage, Wang et al. [13] only considered regular participants in the market and ignored opportunistic participants, so it narrowed the space coverage and cannot obtain more sensing data.
Some research efforts [14] - [16] have been devoted to study the task allocations with location limits of crowdsourcing tasks. A two-stage optimization method, including global optimization with cloaked locations and a local optimization with participants' precise locations, was proposed in [10] to achieve high sensing data coverage and low-cost consumption. But, the method did not take the credibility of contributors into considerations, so that the task server may obtain low-quality sensing data. Zhai and Wang [15] designed a precise sensing effect function with a local constraint and an optimal algorithm based on particle swarm optimization maximizing sensing effect to solve this problem. He et al. [16] devised an efficient local ratio based algorithm (LRBA) and designed a pricing mechanism based on bargaining theory to solve task assignments with location dependence.
A number of research works [17] - [19] focused on task allocations with timeliness restrictions. An efficient and reliable mechanism [17] was proposed to meet the individual rationality, which offered the guideline for a platform to recruit suitable mobile contributors. The distributed task selection algorithm [18] provided the task selection plan for contributors, however the algorithm was based on the fixed mobile contributor set ignoring the dynamic changes of contributors. Wu et al. [19] proposed an approximation algorithm which minimized the total execution time of all tasks, and defined approximate optimal ratios as the ratio of algorithm execution time to the optimal value. The proposed algorithm had good approximate optimal ratios under different parameter sets. Wang et al. [20] considered the location and timeliness limits of crowdsourcing tasks, and studied heterogeneous spatial crowdsourcing task allocation problem. They established a contributor mobility behavior prediction model matching the allocation process, and proposed an effective heuristic method, including multi-round linear weight optimization and enhanced multi-objective particle swarm optimization algorithms to achieve the local optimal allocation of crowdsourcing tasks.
Zhang et al. [21] presented a contextual bandit formulation for task assignment in heterogeneous crowdsourcing to maximize profits of the platform within a limited budget, considering the diversity of contributors. The problem of assignment of tasks was analyzed unilaterally from the perspective of platforms, and the benefits of contributors were overlooked. With time budget constraints of contributors, Amin et al. [22] proposed a meta-heuristic allocation algorithm based on Harmony Search, achieving the goal of maximizing the benefits of crowdsourcing platform.
There have some works studying mobile crowdsourcing market evolution. Yang et al. [23] , Xiao et al. [24] , and Li et al. [25] modeled the competition between platform and mobile contributors as a Stackelberg game in a single iteration, maximizing the platform's utility and contributors' profit. In Stackelberg game, they took the platform as the leader and contributors as followers. Although the single iteration static model has research significance, the multiiteration dynamic model [26] is more suitable for the operation of mobile crowdsourcing market. Lu et al. [27] formulated the service exchange between mobile contributors and crowdsourcing platform as an asymmetric game model. They proposed two-sided rating protocols for maximizing social welfare based on game-theoretic stimulated cooperation among contributors. However, they ignored continuous actions of players in the asymmetric game. Qin et al. [26] analyzed the interactions between the crowdsourcing platform and mobile contributors based on iterated game, which is a continuous model, and they proposed the method to maximize social welfare and solve the low-quality data problem.
The interaction among mobile contributors was formulated as a two-person cooperative game in [28] , and the authors obtained the optimal cooperation decision based on asymmetric Nash bargain solution. But, the work can be extended from one-to-one bargain scenario to one-to-many bargain. On the contrary, Chakeri and Jaimes [29] and Dong et al. [30] both discussed the process of competition among contributors for choosing a platform based on noncooperative game, and gained Nash equilibrium. Sun et al. [31] provided a participatory sensing game model in the spirit of a congestion, and designed a distributed algorithm to get the best responses for Nash equilibrium. In [32] , the interactions among mobile contributors were modeled as evolutionary game, and the evolutionary equilibrium was verified.
From above, considerable research efforts have been devoted to task allocations of single platform and mobile crowdsourcing market evolution mechanisms. However, the potential benefits of WoM have been neglected, and none of these studies have tried to establish the market model with WoM. As mentioned above, with the uses of WoM, it is efficient to build a group of crowdsourcing contributors, and mobile contributors can recruit other contributors relying on different ways satisfying different requirements of crowdsourcing tasks, for example, social networks, physical encounter or opportunistic networks. Distinguished with the above studies, we pay attention to the advantages of WoM, and we study the task distribution and market evolution mechanism of a single crowdsourcing platform in WoM mobile crowdsourcing market. We analyze the interaction behavior among mobile contributors, model the behavior of mobile contributors as Stackelberg games, and design the algorithm for each game to approach the Stackelberg equilibrium. VOLUME 7, 2019 
III. MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS MODEL IN WOM MOBILE CROWDSOURCING MARKET
In this section, we analyze the interactions among mobile contributors. Based on different behavior of contributors, we category all contributors into four types. Then, we design utility function of contributors. Moreover, we focus on invitation behavior among mobile contributors, and propose an inviting mechanism.
A. INTERACTION AMONG MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
It is supposed that there are n(n 2) contributors, and Table 1 . After a crowdsourcing platform releasing a crowdsourcing task which is assumed to have assessment value e, which is one of decision references for contributors to participate in a crowdsourcing task and reflects credibility of the crowdsourcing task. The behavior of contributors can be described as follows:
(1) Mobile contributors sense crowdsourcing tasks with DM or WoM, which means contributors sense crowdsourcing tasks from the crowdsourcing platform or invitations of other mobile contributors. (2) Mobile contributors get the evaluation value e from the crowdsourcing platform and decide whether to participate in the crowdsourcing task. With the increase of e, mobile contributors have a greater willingness to participate in the crowdsourcing task. The mobile contributor who senses crowdsourcing tasks with WoM should feed back the decision about participating in crowdsourcing tasks to its inviter. At the same time, mobile contributors refer to η 1 (reward rate from the platform) to decide whether to send task invitations to other contributors and update its invitation list. (3) Mobile contributors formulate the sensing plan about how much the amount of sensing data they should contribute to the platform. We suppose all mobile contributors are rational, each contributor selfishly goes after the highest profit. In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, the contributors should consider their inviter and invitee's sensing plan when they make their sensing plan strategy. (4) Mobile contributors submit sensing plan, sensing data and the invitation list to the crowdsourcing platform. Among the above contributor behaviors, we discuss the process of sensing crowdsourcing task with WoM for mobile contributors. As shown in Figure 2 , mobile contributor m1 has sensed the crowdsourcing task, and then diffuses the task invitation to mobile contributor m2 with WoM based on its social network or other media. Mobile contributor m2 decides to participate in the crowdsourcing task and feeds messages back to the inviter, hence mobile contributor m1 updates the invitation list accordingly.
B. FOUR TYPES OF CONTRIBUTORS
As mentioned above, contributors can sense crowdsourcing tasks in DM or WoM mode. Once crowdsourcing platform announces crowdsourcing tasks, some contributors sense crowdsourcing tasks from the platform directly with DM mode. Then, contributors joined in the task can invite others with WoM mode to participate in the task. They may invite such as their friends in social networks, strangers encountered in opportunistic network, colleagues in a meeting room, and so on. Through these ways, more and more contributors will be invited to join the task. As shown in Figure 3 , we category all mobile contributors in WoM crowdsourcing market into four types which are zeroth-hand, first-hand, secondhand and third-hand contributors, shown in Figure 3 . Then, we define M 0 , M 1 , M 2 and M 3 as the sets of zeroth-hand, first-hand, second-hand and third-hand contributors respectively. The four types of contributors are described as follows.
(1) Zeroth-hand contributors are the contributors who sense crowdsourcing tasks with DM, and they never recruit any contributors, such as m1 − m3 in Figure 3 . 
C. UTILITY FUNCTION OF CONTRIBUTORS
For compensating the cost of collecting sensing data and stimulating the cooperation between contributors, the crowdsourcing platform offers rewards to contributors, and the reward of each contributor comes from the following aspects.
1) THE REWARD FOR SUBMITTING SENSING DATA
It is supposed contributor m i submits sensing data with contribution quantity d m i , then m i can get g(d m i ) reward from crowdsourcing platform, which is defined in (1).
In (1), αd m i e is the positive reward of contributor m i for submitting sensing data, which are determined by both contribution quantity d m i and the crowdsourcing task evaluation value e. The α, β and γ are weight factors which are correlated with d m i and e, so that the crowdsourcing platform can control the rewards of mobile contributors within a reasonable range via adjusting weight factors. The α is negatively correlated with e and d m i , and both β and γ are positively correlated with d m i . From equation (1), the reward which contributor m i gets does not increase monotonically with the increase of contribution quantity d m i . From the view in real lives, if the value of d m i is too high or too low, the credibility of sensing data may be low for crowdsourcing platform, which means that contributor m i will get very low or even negative rewards. 
2) THE REWARD FOR RECRUITING OTHER CONTRIBUTORS
In (3), in order to motivate contributor m i to accept the invitation from contributor r i , the reward U 2 m i is determined by contribution quantity of contributor m i and its inviter r i together. The η 2 is the reward rate for contributors who accept invitations of other contributors to join in tasks. For a reasonable reward, the range of values of η 2 is controlled by the platform between 0 and 0.5.
The above three aspects together constitute the reward of contributors in WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, the total revenue Q m i of contributor m i is shown in (4). It must be noticed that the main reward comes from the contribution of sensing data, and for reasonable proportions of the second and third aspects, either η 1 and η 2 should take values in [0, 0.5].
Consequently, the utility of contributor m i is equal to total revenue r m i minus the cost for collecting data, which is P m i shown in (5) where d m i is the quantity of collected data and c is the cost per unit.
D. CONTRIBUTORS INVITING MECHANISM
Mobile contributors can recruit mobile contributors by social networks, physical encounters or opportunistic networks. VOLUME 7, 2019 In this paper, we focus on the recruitment based on social networks. Mobile contributors invite other contributors who have close social relationships with them to participate in crowdsourcing tasks. Moreover, the contributors tend to accept the invitation from their close friends. In mobile social networks, the social relationships among mobile contributors can be measured by the communication frequency and communication duration. Therefore, we quantitatively define the close relationship between contributor m i and contributor m j as social closeness C(m i , m j ) shown in (6), (7) and (8), and its possible value shown in Figure 4 . In (7) and (8) It is supposed there are mobile contributors m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n who have their social network S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n respectively. Each contributor calculates the social closeness with friends in its social network, and invites some close friends to join in the task. From the description of the algorithm, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 2 ).
IV. GAME ANALYSIS OF MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
In this section, we study the interactions among mobile contributors based on game theory. We analyze and predict 
mobile contributor m i sends an inviting message to mobile contributor s i j .
7:
if mobile contributor m i received the confirmation message of agreement from mobile contributor s i j then 9:
end if 11: end if 12: end for 13: for w ← 
end if 20: w ← w − 1 21: end for 22 : end for 23: return V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , . . . , V n the quantity of sensing data of mobile contributors, and provide reference for crowdsourcing platform to formulate crowdsourcing tasks and budget evaluation. If the first-hand contributors invite the second-hand contributors or thirdhand contributors to join in crowdsourcing tasks, the former (inviter) makes a decision about contributions quantity of sensing data firstly. Similarly, when the second-hand contributors invite the third-hand or other second-hand contributors, the second-hand contributors make a decision firstly. What's more, the decision of the former directly influences the decision of the latter. Since these interactions satisfy the features of the Stackelberg game model, in the following sections, we will investigate the behavior of mobile contributors using Stackelberg game.
A. Stackelberg GAME OF MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
The interaction between contributors can be modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is a perfect information game consisting of two players. One player acts as the leader who decides the strategy in the first stage of the game, and the other player as the follower decides strategy in the second stage [24] . In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, inviters who recruit other contributors are the leaders of Stackelberg game, and invitees are the followers. Mobile contributors make a decision about the quantity of sensing data one after one according to the order of joining in crowdsourcing tasks. We adopt backward induction approach to analyze Stackelberg game. Firstly, we obtain the best response of the followers in the second stage of Stackelberg game. Then, according to the result of the second stage, we analyze the best response of the leaders in the first stage of the game. We assume that every contributor is rational, and wants to obtain the highest utility from crowdsourcing platform. In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, since the inviter cannot know the following behavior of its invitees, the game exists only between the inviter and its direct invitee.
The game relationship among contributors is shown in Figure 5 , in which there are two types of games. One is the game between first-hand contributors and their invitees, called F-ST Stackelberg game. The other is the game between second-hand contributors and their invitees, called S-ST Stackelberg game. In F-ST Stackelberg game, a contributor who directly finds the crowdsourcing task from the platform (i.e., first-hand contributor) acts as the leader, and the contributors invited by the first-hand contributor (i.e., secondhand or third-hand contributor) are the followers. In S-ST FIGURE 5. Game relationship among contributors.
Stackelberg game, the second-hand contributor is the leader and the invited contributors (i.e., other second-hand or thirdhand contributor) are the followers. Due to the different utility functions of the leaders in these two games, we should analyze the game process of F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg game respectively. As shown in Fig.6 , F-ST Stackelberg game occurs among mobile contributors in the dotted circle. For example, m1 is the leader of F-ST game, and m3 and m4 are the followers. S-ST Stackelberg game occurs among mobile contributors in the real circle. M 5 is the leader of S-ST game, and m8 − m10 are the followers. In the following, we model F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg game respectively.
1) F-ST Stackelberg GAME
This game is between the inviter who senses the crowdsourcing task with DM and its invitees. In this game, the leader is the inviter m i who senses the crowdsourcing task with DM, the followers are its invitees m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n .
The players of the game: The leader m i and followers
The strategy set of a player: The quantity of sensing data A = {1, 2, 3, . . . , a}.
The utility of the player: The utility of leader m i is
The utilities of followers m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n are
It must be noted that the leader cannot know the followup inviting behavior of the followers. Therefore, we don't consider the reward η 1 d m n d n avg of followers.
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2) S-ST Stackelberg GAME This game is between the inviter who senses the crowdsourcing task with WoM and its invitees. In this game, the leader is the inviter m i who senses the crowdsourcing task with WoM, the followers are its invitees m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , . . . , m n . The players of the game: The leader m i and followers m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n .
The utilities of followers m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , . . . , m n are
B. Stackelberg EQUILIBRIUM
In the following, we want to explore whether there is the unique Stackelberg equilibrium in each game mentioned above.
1) F-ST Stackelberg GAME
According to backward induction approach, we should firstly analyze the best response of followers. In order to obtain the best response of the follower m n , we compute the first and second derivative of the P m n with respect to d(m n ) as (13) and (14) respectively.
Since the second derivative of the P m n with respect to d(m n ) is less than zero (i.e., . Based on (16), we can compute the average contribution of all followers as (17) .
With (17) and (9), we compute the first and second derivative of the P(m i ) with respect to d m i as (18) and (19) respectively.
Since we have
Solve (20) as (21) . 
Then we analyze the best response of leader m i . Since the leader m i cannot get information about the sensing mode of its inviter r i , the leader m i randomly sets the sensing mode of its inviter r i . Thus d r i should be discussed as two cases.
Case 1: The inviter r i of leader m i senses tasks with DM Since inviter r i senses tasks with DM, we know that inviter r i is the first-hand contributor. Hence, based on the best response of leader in F-ST Stackelberg game (21), we have
Based on (11), (23) and (24), we compute the first and second derivative of the P(m i ) with respect to d m i as (25) and (26) respectively.
Solve (27) as (28) . Since inviter r i senses tasks with WoM, we know that inviter r i is the second-hand contributor. Hence, its strategy is same as the leader's strategy in S-ST Stackelberg game, we have
Based on (11) and (23), we compute the first and second derivative of the P m i with respect to d m i as (30) and (31) .
Solve (32), we have the best response d * m i as (33) . 
C. A PROOF OF EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF Stackelberg EQUILIBRIUM
In this subsection, we show the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium in the above-mentioned F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg games. To prove the uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium, we need to prove the uniqueness of the best response of each player. We give a proof example of F-ST Stackelberg game equilibrium, and the proof of S-ST Stackelberg game equilibrium can be proved similarly. Firstly, we state the definition of Stackelberg game which is shown as Definition 1.
) is the Stackelberg equilibrium in Stackelberg game.
Theorem 1: The Stackelberg equilibrium of F-ST Stackelberg game exists and it is unique.
Proof: First, we will prove that the best response of each player in F-ST Stackelberg game is unique.
To 
Setting the first derivative of the P m i to 0, we have
Solving for d m i in (35), we obtain
We mark the right part of (36) To the followers: The first derivative of the utility function P m n of the follower m n on d m n is as follows.
Setting the first derivative of the P m n to 0, we have
Solving for d m n in (38), we obtain
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We refer b 2 as the right part of (39). We can see that the utility function of follower m n monotonously increases in d m n ∈ [0, b 2 ) and decreases in d m n ∈ [b 2 , +∞). The follower m n will get the maximum benefit adopting strategy b 2 , giving any leader strategy d r n . Therefore, b 2 is the unique best response of follower m n and satisfies the condition of Definition 1.
Based on Definition 1, Stackelberg equilibrium is a strategy profile of best response for each player in Stackelberg game. We have demonstrated that each player in F-ST Stackelberg game has the only best response. Therefore, the Stackelberg equilibrium of F-ST Stackelberg game exists and it is unique.
D. EQUILIBRIUM ALGORITHM FOR MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
Based on the above analysis, we propose an algorithm to calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium, as shown in Algorithm 2.
Every contributor in crowdsourcing market decides whether to participate in crowdsourcing task, and contributors get corresponding best response according to different contributor types. From the description, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n).
V. PERFORMANCE A. SIMULATION SETUP
In this section, we present a series of simulation experiments to support the above theoretical analysis. The simulation tool is Matlab R2014b on Windows 10. The experimental parameter settings are shown in Table 2 . The value of α, β, γ , η 1 and η 2 are referenced to [33] , which are determined empirically and can be adjusted dynamically. If the simulation experiment environment changes, the above parameter settings should be adjusted. We set the value of e as 0.5 which is the median of (0, 1), so that it guarantees general applicability of experimental results. The value of unit cost c is 0.1 referring the settings in [34] and [35] . The setting of these parameters is to make contributors have the reasonable incomes. 
B. BEST RESPONSE OF MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
In WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, mobile contributors have different utility functions. For zeroth-hand contributors, the utility is just related with d m i . As shown in Figure 6 , when relevant parameters are determined, there is a unique best sensing data contribution that maximizes utility for zerothhand contributors. Figure 7 reflects the utility of first-hand end if 14: end if 15: if mobile contributor m i ∈ M 3 then 16: if the inviter of m i is in M 1 then 17: compute d * m i using (16) and (21) 18: end if 19: if the inviter of m i is in M 2 and the inviter set its inviter's sensing mode as DM mode then 20: compute d * m i using (22) and (28) 21: end if 22: if the inviter of m i is in M 2 and the inviter set its inviter's sensing mode as WoM mode then 23: compute d * m i using (22) and (33) 24: end if 25: end if 26: end if 27 : end for 28: Comparing the utility of mobile contributors in the market, it can be concluded that the crowdsourcing platform controls the quality of sensing data via designing the reward for contributors, and stimulates mobile contributors to participate in crowdsourcing tasks and recruit other contributors with WoM. If the quantity of sensing data of a mobile contributor is too large or too small, its utility is negative. The reason is that sensing data with a large quantity has low reliability and sensing data with a small quantity lacks usability and value. From the experimental results, it can be seen that the utility of first-hand, second-hand and third-hand mobile contributors and the corresponding best response are greater than that of the zeroth-hand contributors. Furthermore, the utility and the best response of second-hand contributors are the greatest among the four types of contributor, which indicates that contributors could get higher utility with WoM than that with DM. Consequently, contributors tend to sense crowdsourcing tasks and recruit contributors with WoM.
C. UNIQUENESS OF Stackelberg EQUILIBRIUM OF MOBILE CONTRIBUTORS
We have formulated the behavior of mobile contributors with Stackelberg game, and analyzed F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg game respectively. The above work has shown the unique Stackelberg equilibrium in both F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg game. There are curves showing the best response for leaders and followers. Stackelberg equilibrium is the intersection point of the best response curves of leader and follower. of leader. Figure 11 depicts the Stackelberg equilibrium when the inviter of leader senses crowdsourcing tasks with DM. If the inviter of leader senses crowdsourcing tasks with WoM, we can see the Stackelberg equilibrium from Figure 12 . Through equilibrium results comparison, it shows that the strategy (quantity of sensing data) obtained at stackelberg equilibrium in S-ST Stackelberg game is obviously larger than that of F-ST stackelberg game. It is because the leader in the F-ST Stackelberg game senses crowdsourcing tasks with DM, while the leader in S-ST Stackelberg game senses crowdsourcing tasks with WoM. Different modes lead to different utility and different incentives for mobile contributors to make a decision of sensing data contributions.
D. IMPACT OF η 1 , η 2 AND e ON Stackelberg EQUILIBRIUM
We explore the impact of relevant parameters on the Stackelberg equilibrium using simulation experiments. As shown in Figure 13 , Figure 14 and Figure 15 . When reward rate η 1 and η 2 increase or decrease simultaneously with the same proportion, the Stackelberg equilibrium changes identically. If η 1 and η 2 increase, the strategies of leaders and followers at Stackelberg equilibrium are greater, and vice versa. The emergence of such an experimental phenomenon is reasonable, since the increase or decrease of reward rates will have a direct impact on the utility of mobile contributors. The greater reward rates motivate mobile contributors to decide greater data contributions. Similarly, Figure 16 , Figure 17 and Figure 18 reflect that there is a positive correlation between evaluation values e and data contributions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is the behavior analysis of mobile contributors in WoM mobile crowdsourcing market. We first have categorized mobile contributors into four types and proposed an inviting algorithm to reach the recruitment of contributors. In order to study the evolution of WoM mobile crowdsourcing market, we have modeled the interactions among mobile contributors as two types of game, which are F-ST and S-ST Stackelberg games. Furthermore, backward induction approach has been used to analyze each game, and we have proposed an algorithm to compute the best response of every contributor, while reaching the Stackelberg equilibrium. At last, the results have shown that the stackelberg equilibrium of each game is existed and unique. We also evaluate the performance of utility of contributors and explore the impact of system parameters on Stackelberg equilibrium. It is meaningful for crowdsourcing platform to program crowdsourcing tasks and evaluate task budgets.
